We find Washington’s other arguments unconvincing.
Washington emphasizes one phrase in the waiver statute,
namely, the phrase that allows a State to apply its workers’
compensation laws to federal premises “as if the premises
were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.”
§3172(a). This phrase, however, appears immediately after
the “in the same way and to the same extent” language.
Ibid. And, as we explained above, reading the two clauses
together, the statute could plausibly be interpreted to allow
only the extension of generally applicable workers’ compensation laws to federal premises. It thus does not clearly and
unambiguously permit the kind of discrimination that
Washington’s “federal workers only” law contains.
Washington also points to other congressional waivers of
intergovernmental immunity that explicitly maintain the
constitutional prohibition against discriminatory state
laws. Congress, for example, has waived immunity from
state taxation of a federal officer, but only “if the taxation
does not discriminate against the officer . . . because of the
source of the pay or compensation.” 4 U. S. C. §111(a). Congress has also waived immunity from the application of certain state environmental laws to federal facilities, but only
if the law does not “apply any standard or requirement to
such facilities which is more stringent than” the standards
applicable to nonfederal facilities. 42 U. S. C. §9620(a)(4).
The waiver statute here, Washington points out, does not
contain any similarly explicit antidiscrimination language.
This fact, however, does not tip the balance sufficiently in
Washington’s favor. As we have explained, preventing discrimination against the Federal Government is a core aspect of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. This immunity prohibits States from enacting discriminatory laws
10 UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON
Opinion of the Court
unless Congress clearly and unambiguously waives it. See
Goodyear Atomic, 486 U. S., at 180. The fact that Congress
more explicitly preserved the immunity in other contexts
does not mean that Congress clearly waived it here. Nor
does the lack of an explicit antidiscrimination reference
convert an ambiguous statutory waiver into one that unambiguously authorizes discrimination. Indeed, Washington
points to no waiver statute that courts have interpreted as
permitting the kind of explicit discrimination that Washington’s law contains. Given that broader context, Congress’ explicit antidiscrimination language in the tax and
environmental waivers as much suggests Congress’ general
hesitation to allow discrimination as it suggests that Congress authorized it here.
Finally, Washington seeks support from our decision in
Goodyear Atomic. The issue in that case, however, concerned the scope of the phrase “‘workmen’s compensation
laws’”
in §3172’s substantively-identical predecessor statute. See 486 U. S., at 183. Specifically, the question was
whether that phrase encompassed state laws that permitted “supplemental” workers’ compensation awards or only
state laws that permitted “standard” awards. Ibid. We
held that the phrase encompassed laws permitting supplemental awards. See ibid. (stating that the statute “places
no express limitation on the type of workers’ compensation
scheme that is authorized”). But in doing so, we said nothing about laws that explicitly discriminate against the Federal Government. Rather, we wrote that, “[o]n its face,” the
waiver statute “compels the same workers’ compensation
award for an employee injured at a federally owned facility
as the employee would receive if working for a wholly private facility.” Id., at 183–184. We added that it was “clear”
from the statute’s text “that Congress intended” state workers’ compensation laws “to apply to federal facilities ‘to the
same extent’ that they apply to private facilities within the
State.” Id., at 185. These statements from Goodyear
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 11
Opinion of the Court
Atomic tend to support, not undermine, our conclusion today.
* * *
Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Federal Government and its contractors. Because §3172 does
not clearly and unambiguously waive the Government’s immunity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The Ninth
Circuit’s conclusion to the contrary is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
